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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER DALE BRIGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44328
Ada County Case No.
CR-2016-942

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Briggs failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of 10 years, with two
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent
to deliver?

Briggs Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
On January 24, 2016, Briggs drove through the City of Boise while under the
influence of a controlled substance, “‘fell asleep at the wheel,’” drove off the roadway,
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and crashed his van into a fence. (PSI, pp.3-4, 278. 1) When officers responded, Briggs
was still asleep, with the engine running and the vehicle in drive; officers “had to pound
on the driver’s window for Briggs to wake up.” (PSI, p.278.) Briggs failed field sobriety
testing and officers arrested him for DUI and on two outstanding warrants. (PSI, p.278.)
Upon searching Briggs’ vehicle, officers found a black zipper pouch containing “various
drug paraphernalia-related items, such as a cut straw, spoon, plastic baggies, and a
digital scale”; a tin “which contained a digital scale, three individual baggies containing
4.5g, 2.3g, and 2.3g” of methamphetamine and a plastic bag containing Oxymorphone;
and a backpack containing 13 cellular phones. (PSI, pp.3-4, 278.)
The state charged Briggs with possession of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver, possession of Oxymorphone, misdemeanor DUI, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.36-37.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Briggs pled guilty to
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and misdemeanor DUI, and the
state dismissed the remaining charges, agreed not to file a persistent violator
enhancement, and also agreed to recommend a sentence of “not more than 2+8 with
imposition.” 2 (R., p.40.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with
two years fixed. (R., pp.50-54.) Briggs filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “BRIGGS
44328 psi.pdf.”
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In his Appellant’s brief, Briggs incorrectly states that the state agreed to recommend “a
suspended sentence of ten years, with two years fixed.” (Appellant’s brief, p.2.) The
record indicates that the state agreed to – and did – recommend that the sentence be
imposed, not suspended. (R., pp.40, 43; Tr., p.3, Ls.6-12; PSI, pp.1, 24-25.)
2

sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.61-64, 71-74.) Briggs filed a notice of
appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.7880.)
Briggs asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he was placed in restrictive housing and will
not be eligible for programming until 2017, and because, he claims, “the district court’s
decision to deny [his] motion for leniency was inextricably tied to its erroneous
interpretation of [his] past sentences, and its belief that he had already had multiple
rehabilitative opportunities on probation.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) Briggs has failed
to establish an abuse of discretion.
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence,
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review
the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440,
442 (2008).
Briggs did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he failed to
provide any “new” information in support of his Rule request for leniency. In his Rule 35
motion, Briggs merely stated that he was placed in restrictive housing and was “not
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eligible for programs until 2017.” (R., p.62.) The district court was aware, at the time of
sentencing, of Briggs’ desire to participate in programming and that he may be placed in
“solitary confinement” at the prison due to his history. (See PSI, p.25 (“I want help and
treatment I don’t want to be warehoused I cant obtain programs in [prison] because of
the seriousness of the threat to my safety’” (verbatim)); Tr., p.11, Ls.15-19 (“His prior
incarcerations hav[e] largely been ISMI, and he’s maxed out …. He’s never had any
significant drug treatment”); Tr., p.12, Ls.7-13 (“Prison doesn’t necessarily work for Mr.
Briggs … he simply isn’t getting the treatment that he wants or needs while
incarcerated, and he has very little confidence based on past history that that’s going to
be afforded to him if he’s sent to the state on this occasion”); Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.15, L.13
(“My concern with the prison is that the sentence structure and past DOR history, is that
their answer … is going to be the same as it always has, which is … we’re going to
throw the key away and just forget about him, and that’s what’s happened to me. …
Their response has been to just segregate me and keep me in solitary confinement”);
PSI, pp.5-17 (Brigg’s history of criminal offending, violating probation, and excessive
number of DOR’s (at least 30) and jail incident reports (33 since 2011).) Furthermore,
the Department of Correction’s decision with respect to Briggs’ housing placement while
incarcerated does not fall under the purview of the district court’s discretion, nor is it
“new” information that entitles Briggs to a reduction of sentence.
Although Briggs asserts, on appeal, that his IDOC classification is “prohibit[ing]
him from receiving programming,” there is no indication that this is the case; in fact, the
opposite is true, as the inmate classification sheet notes that Briggs will be paroleeligible in 2018 and should begin substance abuse programming and Thinking for a
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Change in 2017. (Appellant’s brief, p.5; R., p.66.) In his Rule 35 motion, Briggs merely
complained that he was unable to immediately access programming. (R., pp.62-63.) It
is not new information that prisoners are most often placed in programming nearer to
their date of parole eligibility. Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is
an issue more properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.” State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho
518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of
defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion).
Because Briggs presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he
failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to
make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Briggs’ claim, Briggs has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. Briggs contends that “the district court’s decision to
deny [his] motion for leniency was inextricably tied to its erroneous interpretation of [his]
past sentences, and its belief that he had already had multiple rehabilitative
opportunities on probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Specifically, Briggs points to the
district court’s comment, in its order denying his Rule 35 motion, that it did not agree
with Briggs’ claim that “he’d never had rehabilitative programming except growing up
supervised in the juvenile corrections system and a rider” because Briggs “had [the]
benefit of … probation on his weapons felony in 2005 (for which he was later violated),
and probation for his felony possession of controlled substance from 2009 (which
probation was successful and later discharged[)].” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7; R., p.73
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(parenthetical notations original).) Briggs asserts that, because he served time in prison
in these two specific cases, the district’s belief that he had already had multiple
rehabilitative opportunities while on probation court was erroneous. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.6-7.) However, according to the PSI, Briggs was sentenced – on December 2, 2005
– to 18 months of prison “followed by 3 years of supervised release,” and he “was
released from custody to U.S. Probation” on January 12, 2006; he was subsequently
“charged with” (and found guilty of) a “Violation of Probation” and was ordered to serve
six months in prison, “followed by 30 months supervised release”; and he was later
found guilty of a “Parole Violation” and was consequently ordered to serve an additional
nine months in prison. (PSI, p.16 (emphasis added).) Briggs did not object to the
interchangeable use of the terms “supervised release” and “probation” in the PSI; as
such, it was not improper for the court to use the same language. Moreover, that the
court characterized Briggs’ supervised release as “probation” is inconsequential
because both are forms of community supervision, and Briggs did, in fact, have
rehabilitative opportunities while on supervised release, which was the crux of the
district court’s statement. (See Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18 (“except for his federal supervised
release supervision, he’s never had any kind of aftercare” (emphasis added)).)
With respect to the district court’s statement regarding the 2009 felony
possession of controlled substance case, it does appear that the court mistakenly wrote
that Briggs was granted probation in that particular case.

(R., p.73; PSI, p.10.)

However, such an error was necessarily harmless, as the court’s overall conclusion that
Briggs had previously been afforded opportunities for treatment while in the community
was correct and, more importantly, the court’s primary focus in denying Briggs’ Rule 35
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motion was Briggs’ ongoing criminal offending and the risk he poses to the community,
not Briggs’ rehabilitation. (R., pp.71-74.) Where a district court’s discretionary decision
is “tainted by … factual error, the appropriate appellate response ordinarily is to remand
for a proper exercise of discretion, free of error.” State v. McDonald, 124 Idaho 103,
107, 856 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). “However, a remand may be
avoided if it is plain from the judge’s own expressed reasoning that the result would not
change.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
The district court was correct in concluding that Briggs has previously been
afforded multiple opportunities for probation and programming. Briggs’ record indicates
that he has been placed on probation in at least 11 different cases, and he has violated
the terms of community supervision at least eight times.

(PSI, pp.5-16.)

Briggs

indicated that he was provided with “aftercare” while on federal supervision, and stated
that he participated in the ARC program “upon his release from prison in 2010” and
attended treatment at the Port of Hope in 2011. (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18; PSI, p.23.) In
addition, “staff at District 4 in Boise” reported that Briggs attended “drug & alcohol
groups” at their office. (PSI, p.33.) As such, the district court was correct in concluding
that Briggs had, in fact, had previous opportunities for rehabilitative treatment,
regardless of whether or not those opportunities took place during a probationary period
specifically for the 2009 possession of a controlled substance case.
Moreover, the court made the statement with respect to the 2005 and 2009
cases in the course of disagreeing with Briggs’ claim that he had never had
opportunities for treatment, not as its reason for denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., p.73.)
In fact, the court agreed that Briggs “is in need of rehabilitative treatment,” but advised
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that it was “not willing to expedite [Briggs’] treatment over those within the Department
of Corrections that have not yet had the opportunity for that treatment.” (PSI, p.73.)
The district court articulated its reasons for denying Briggs’ Rule 35 request for leniency,
specifically stating that Briggs’ sentence “was reasonable at the time given [Briggs’]
criminal history and continuing course of criminal conduct,” and correctly noting that the
primary sentencing consideration is the good order and protection of society. (R., p.73.)
The court detailed Briggs’ numerous criminal convictions in the two years preceding the
instant offense, concluding that Briggs’ conduct demonstrated “a return to criminogenic
thinking and exhibit[s] a danger to the community.”

(R., p.73.)

The district court

concluded its analysis by stating:
To the extent Defendant contends he would obtain better
rehabilitative programming if he were placed on the retained jurisdiction
program, the Court notes, “that rehabilitation – important as it may be – is
not the sole objective of our criminal justice system. A sentence of
confinement is not rendered unreasonable simply because it will have an
arguably negative impact upon [Defendant]'s rehabilitation.” State v.
Morrison, 1191daho 229, 232, 804 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted). See also State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d
498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991).
(R., pp.73-74.) It is clear, from the district court’s expressed reasoning in its order
denying Briggs’ Rule 35 motion, that even if the court were to consider the fact that
Briggs was not placed on probation in the 2009 case, doing so would not have affected
the court’s decision to deny Briggs’ request for leniency. Because the same result
would have been reached without the alleged error, any such error was necessarily
harmless.
At sentencing, the state addressed the seriousness of the offense, Briggs’ failure
to accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct, the danger he poses to society, his
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low rehabilitative potential and failure to rehabilitate despite prior treatment
opportunities, and his abysmal history of criminal conduct, victimizing others, and
refusing to abide by institutional rules. (Tr., p.3, L.5 – p.5, L.25 (Appendix A).) The
district court subsequently articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Briggs’ sentence. (Tr., p.19, L.7 –
p.22, L.6 (Appendix B).) The sentence imposed was appropriate, and Briggs has not
shown that he was entitled to a reduction of his sentence simply because he would like
to begin programming sooner. The state submits that Briggs has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendices A
and B.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Briggs’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 10th day of January, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of January, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

10

APPENDIX A

State v. Christopher D. Briggs

1

1

BOISE, IDAHO

2

2

APRIL 28, 2016

3
4

3

SENTENCING HEARING

4

5
8
7
8

9

110
11

12

5
8
7

THE COURT: State of Idaho versus Christopher
Briggs. Mr. Briggs is present in custody. He's
represented by Mr. Thomson, and the state Is represented
by Mr. Wittwer in this case. I've had an opportunity to
receive and review the presentence investigation in this
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Mr. Wittwer, have you had the opportunity to
receive and review that?
MR. WITIWER: I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you note any additions or
corrections?
MR. WITIWER: No; I did not
THE COURT: Mr. Thomson, have you had the
opportunity to review it?
MR. THOMSON: We have.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Briggs, have you had the
opportunity to review that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
request for restitution?
MR. THOMSON: No; we've been over that already,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Wittwer, you can argue.
MR. WITIWER: Thank you.
Your Honor, the state recommends that the court
impose a sentence consistent with the plea agreement in
this case and order a judgment of conviction with a
sentence of 10 years with 2 years fixed and 8 years
indeterminate. I'm not going to recommend fine as we're
recommending imposition of sentence, and the court has
ordered a restitution in excess of $700 here.
On Count 3, the DUI, I would just ask the court
to order a concurrent amount of jail time as well as a
six months driver's license suspension as required by
law. This was a case where the defendant was driving a
van. It crashed into a fence. This was during the
middle of the day on a road that's pretty busy. That
time of day, it's a populated area. The police
responded to a call for an injury crash, found the
defendant crashed into a fence passed out in the
driver's seat behind the wheel of a van with the engine
still running. They noticed that he had needle marks on
his arms. They conducted standardized field sobriety
tests on him, which he failed. He did not register any
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Case No. CR-FE-2016-0000942
THE COURT: And did you talk with your counsel
about whether there's any additions or corrections?
THE DEFENDANT: I think we're good.
THE COURT: Mr. Thomson, did you note any
additions or corrections?
MR. THOMSON: I do have corrections. Many of
them are corrections with characterizations. I think
I1l bring those up in argument if that's all right
THE COURT: Okay. The way the presentence
investigator characterizes his responses?
MR. THOMSON: Correct.
THECOURT: Soyoudon'tdisagreethatthat's
what he said to the presentenoe Investigator?
MR. THOMSON: But there are some objections to
actually what was said.
THE COURT: All right. I'll take those by way
of argument in that this is what the presentence
investigator prepared based on their perceptions; okay?
MR. THOMSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Is there a request for restitution?
MR. WITIWER: There is, Your Honor. I provided
a copy of a proposed order to counsel just a moment ago,
and the information was previously sent to his office.
We're requesting $703.66.
THE COURT: ls there any objection to that
alcohol content on the breath test, and they attempted
to do a DRE, but he was not able to stay awake and
comply with that, so they did a blood draw. He was
charged with DUI for being under the influence of drugs.
In the van was found methamphetamlne in three
different baggies. There was paraphernalia found,
including two digital scales. There were over so
plastic baggies that were found, typically, the types
used for packaging or containing controlled substances,
such as, methamphetamine, and then there were multiple
phones as well that were found.
Mr. Briggs pled guilty in this case to
possession with intent to deliver, but at this point,
it's very clear that he's not accepting responsibility
for the crime that he pled guilty to. He's not
accountable, and I believe that that raises his risk
level significantly.
The conduct in this case and the facts of what
occurred really show that he is a continuing risk to the
welfare of the community. As I said, this crash
happened in the middle of the day. He was admittedly
coming down off of methamphetamine and ju.st he himself,
quote/unquote, "crashed on methamphetamine" and ended up
crashing the car he was driving, which could have very
easily resulted, again, as in a lot of DUI cases, in
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inj ury or death to an innocent bystander or another
motorist.
Clearly, he has serious substance-abuse
problems. Criminal history-wise, he has a very long
felony and misdemeanor record. His record is contained
between 10 and 11 pages in the PSI. It's noted in the
present ence report that he has numerous jail incident
reports since 2011, which include disrespect to staff
and disregard for the property at the jail, damaging
property and such. It's clear to the state that he
isn't just an addict. It's apparent that he's also
selling. His priors aren't just drug-related. They are
violent crimes. There's theft. There's a weapons
charge, violation of court orders, resisting and
obstructing, so a wide variety of crimes that also show
that he is on multiple occasions victimized others.
He has been given prior rehabilitative
opportunities and based on what I see of his history,
his ongoing conduct, and then the attitude just
generally that's reflected in his lack of
accountability, showing in the statements that he makes,
I do not see Mr. Briw as someone with a high
rehabilitation potential at this point, so based on all
that, Your Honor, I believe that the plea agreement
sentence is approoriate, and I'm asking you impose it.
Missouri with his mot her. He was home for about a
year-and-a-half, instead of a year, and on page 4, 18
and 19, when describing his p revious marriage, the
presentence investigator indicates that he met her while
partying; although, my client indicates that he may have
told her that they met at a bar, that there was never
indication that that was necessarily partying; that be
was out doing drugs; that it was reckless; that it was
any kind of a -- he thought that that characterization
diminished and minimized that relationship or the
seriousness which he took it at the time.
On page 19, it does appear that t he presentence
investigator contacted Mr. Robert Johnson. I believe at
the top of page 19 on the first page -- there may have
just been an omission -- but it says, "And would plan to
live with his Robert J ohnson. I believe that should say
"Boss Robert Johnson who has a job for him in the
future", and she characterized that as a possible job.
Elsewhere, she contacted Mr. Johnson. It does sound
like Mr. Johnson was willing to give him employment upon
his release, so to the extent that she meant possible
only conditional upon his release, then that would be
fair. On page 19, again, he disputes that he ever used
the term "couch surfing". That's not necessarily
something in his vocabulary, but I do see it frequently

1 Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
2
Mr. Thomson, would you like to be heard?
3
MR. THOMSON: Yes, Your Honor.
4
In reviewing the presentence materials with my
5
6 client, my client was struck with some of the
7 characterizations that he believed were implied or come
8 from just a plain reading of the presentence report. He
9 personally has suspicions as to whether there was a bias
10 involved in the interview from the presentence report.
11 We're not asking that it be re-done or re-evaluated.
Mr. Briggs was in a former relationship with
12
13 Rebecca Wills of the Parole Commission and at least it's
14 his belief that that individual may have reached out in
15 the preparation of this presentence investigation. Of
16 course, I have no information to that effect other than
17 Mr. Briggs sort of asking himself why the presentence
18 investigator in this ease would, in his own mind , have
19 it out for him, and just a couple of examples that I
20 wanted to bring up in the presentence materials where me
21 client does sort of dispute -- or does dispute how he
22 was quoted.
On page 4 on the last paragraph, there was -23
the
last
full paragraph on line 4 -- he indicates that
24
he
had
told
the pre.sentence investigator that he was in
25
in
the
presentence
investigation, so I don't know if
1
that's
a
term
that
they
use to almost to sort of
2
3 indicate itinerant housing situations.
And then on page 2 2, in the middle paragraph,
4
5 under my client's "Mental Health", the second paragraph
6 under the Mental Health caption, the direct quote that
7 she used in her recitation of their interview says,
8 "Because I had done so much time in solitacy
9 confinement. I lack social skills." Again, my client
10 says that he never said that, not necessarily the way
11 that he speaks, a phrase that would be vecy unlikely
12 that he would have used. He does ad.m it that because of
13 his time in custody and closed custody that he doesn't
14 necessarily like being around people and that message
15 was probably conveyed in those terms, that he prefers to
16 be alone, that he likes to do things alone, so he
17 doesn't necessarily dispute the message there, but the
18 actual terms, given the fact that that was in quotes.
And then he disputes the fact that he ever used
19
20 the tenn "dick head" in his interview with the
21 presentenc.e investigator when speaking about the police
22 officer, so those are some of the disputations that my
23 client has with regard to the presentence materials.
I wanted to bring up just two points in making
24
25 Mr. Briw' request. He is asking that Your Honor

Penny Tardiff, CSR #712. (208) 287-7588
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State v. Christooher D. Bria-

1
1 the same processes when I get out with nothing but the
2
2 clothes on my back. I go back to the home front. I'll
3
3 make us some money and I'm here to get on track and back
4
4 on your feet. I don't want to do that. I don't want to
5
5 keep doing that. I'm 37 years old. I've got health
6
6 problems now. I'm getting older. I'm ready to settle
7
7 down and, you know, start living life responsibly.
8
8
I feel like I would benefit from the treatment
9
9 programs that would not be available to me out there.
10
10 Why? Because I take life a lot more seriously now. I
11
11 realize that ifl were given probation today that,
12
12 Briggs, this is yourlast chance. You know, if you mess
13
13 up again, you are going to go to prison. You're going
14
14 to get Info Part II. You're going to sexve the rest of
15
15 your life in maximum security.
16
16
I'm just asking the court to recognize that, you
17
17 know, the change of circumstance between now and back
18
18 then and just not characterize me as the same old Briggs
19
19 that's always come in here. I'm asking for a chance at
20
20 probation. You know, the U.S. probation officer, those
21
21 were not things where I just refused to conform to, you
22
22 know, the conditions of supervised release. It was tlat
23
23 out, no; I don't want to do this. I'm not ready for
24
24 this. I'd rather just rather have my sentence imposed
25
25 and do my time. I chose not to do community
1
1 tosay.
2
2
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
3
3
Does either party have any legal cause why
4
4 sentence cannot be imposed?
5
5
MR. WITIWER: No, Your Honor.
6
8
MR. THOMSON: No.
7
THE COURT: Mr. Briggs, your counsel indicated
7
8
the
Toohill
factors.
What
he
was
referring
to
is
8
9
9 there's four factors I have to consider in every case,
10
110 and that's the protection of society, the deterrence of
11
11 crime, the rehabilitation of the offender as well as
12
12 punishment, and in this particular case, I've also
13
13 considered the criteria under 19-2521, which is the
14
14 criteria for placing someone on probation or imposing
15
15 imprisonment. And I do count people's criminal history,
1 18 and I count them, not just by number, but I also count
18
17
17 them by frequency, and so this isn't an issue of simple
18
1a math of this is a fourth felony, so fourth felony, this
1
19
19 is the answer.
20
20
I recognize that you came out ofjuvenile
21
121 detention to pick up your first felony and go on a
22
22 rider, and you were relinquished at that time. A lot
23
23 can change over 20 years. And I specifically lined off
24
24 2014 and 2015. Those were not particularly good years
25
25 for you because I noticed the frequency of your

I
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supervision. It wasn't me out running a muck, you know,
causing problems; it was me asking the judge to revoke
me so I could go back and finish my time. I haven't had
any programming. I went to C.Ottonwood because I had my
HSC and because I didn't have a drug problem back then,
I was assigned to labor detail. After two weeks, I was
sent back to prison. You know, I didn't get to do
education classes. I didn't get to do treatment
courses, ABC, CSC. I've never gotten none of those
classes. I feel like I would benefit from that now.
I'm a little bit older and little bit more willing to
pay attention.
I've been relatively incident-free in jail this
time. There was an incident that I have no recollection
even occurring. When I first came into custody, I was
asleep, so I missed my first two video arraignments
because I couldn't stay awake. Apparently, there was an
incident in medical where I raised my voice at a deputy.
I have no recollection. You know, I need to wake up and
realize what's going on around me, and I found myself
kind of where I'm not even remembering. I'm blacking
out, sleeping. I can't even get up and make my court
appearances because I'm coming down so hard, and then
it's time to wake up and get with the program. I'm
asking the court give me a program. That's all I have
behaviors were certainly increasing during those
timeframes, albeit, misdemeanors.
But, perhaps, the issues with the presentence
investigator, as well as with the prison system, can be
answered some by your criminal history and the repeated
instances of domestic violence, battery, disturbing the
peace, disturbing the peace, harassment, stalking,
resisting and obstructing, assaults, contempt, probation
violations, those types of behaviors, and I point this
out to you, not to tell you that we should just flush
you away, you're doing life on the installment plan, but
you have to take accountability for how you got here,
but I agree, people get tired of this, and you've got to
do something different, but something different has to
start with you. Everything can't be authority's
problem.
So the approach to rehabilitation, I know that
you say you've never had rehabilitative programing
except for the juvenile detention, but that programming
is going to be available in the Department of
C.Orrections if you conform your behavior. Department of
Corrections has changed, and I know you don't think
that's true. It has changed. It is changing. The same
programs that were available on the rider are available
before parole, but your access to those programs are
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1 going to depend o n your behavior within the institution,
2 and if the behaviors that I see here of disturbing the
3 peace and resisting and obstructing, batteries,
4 disorderly conduct, if those are the behaviors that the
5 parole commission is seeing, you're absolutely right.
6 You won't be parole-eligible, but they have a great
7 emphasis now through the legislature restrictions that
8 they have to release those that they can close to the
9 end of their fixed time and not to hold them over after
10 the fixed time, and I want to point that out to you
11 because the way that you behave when you get to RDU is
12 going to be essential in whether you get the programming
13 that you're asking for, but when I have to consider the
14 factors that I consider, I have to consider protection
15 of society first, and when you crash your vehicle and
16 you are so out of it that the First Responders can't
17 even wake you, I have to look at that, and my first
18 responsibility to protect the public, but I am very
19 hopeful for you to actually engage in the rehabilitative
20 programming because even if I max this sentence out -21 well, it's a life sentence, but, quite frankly, you're
22 either going to get it or you're not.
It's been 2 0 years since you've turned an adult.
23
24 You're going to spend the rest of your life on the
25 instalment plan now that yo u're a persistent violator
The presentence materials will be sealed in this
1
2 case, and I do wish you well, Mr. Briggs.
(Proceed ings concluded.)
3

1 unless you're able to conform your behavior to the rules
2 of the community, and I'm really hopeful that you will
3 take the sentiment that you've expressed today to the
4 institution and behave accord ingly so that you can get
5 the rehabilitative programing and get an opportunity to
6 live on the outside as a law-abiding citizen.
In this case, I'm going to impose a judgment of
7
8 conviction with 2 years fixed, 8 years indeterminate for
9 a total of 10 years on Count 1. On Count 3, I'm going
10 to impose six months of confinement. I'm going to
11 suspend your driver's license for six months. I'm not
12 going to order a fine on either costs. I am going to
13 order court costs on each count, restitution of $703.66,
14 public defender reimbursement of $250. You will be
15 required to submit a DNA sample because you've not yet
16 done that. You'll have to pay! $100 restitution for
17 that sample.
Mr. Briggs, this is a final judgment. You have
18
19 the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The
20 time for taking an appeal is 4 2 days from the date the
21 judgment is made and filed. You may be represented by
22 counsel in bringing that appeal. lf you cannot afford
23 to hire an attorney for the appeal, one will be
24 appointed to represent you at public expense if you're
25 an indigent person under Title 19.
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